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Europe is now stuck in a fiscal trap, brought about by the
failure of orthodox economics to provide an effective
strategy for economic growth.
by Blog Admin
The United States has yet to resolve its “fiscal cliff”, its own version of austerity.  Dimitri B.
Papadimitriou and Greg Hannsgen of the Levy Economics Institute offer an analysis of
what they term the “fiscal trap.” They argue many economists and policymakers continue to
misunderstand the role of fiscal policy, especially in times of economic turmoil, and have, as
a result, failed to offer effective policies to repair the economies of the US and eurozone. 
Why would US policymakers contemplate f ollowing Europe’s f ailed austerity policies by
imposing spending cuts and tax increases that are widely expected to push the US
economy back into a recession? Why would EU countries continue austerity policies that
have not brought economic recovery? To address these questions, we present a model
of  what we call the “f iscal trap”: a self - imposed spiral of  economic contraction resulting
f rom a f undamental misunderstanding of  the role and f unction of  f iscal policy in t imes of
economic weakness.
The results of  austerity policies in the UK and in much of  the eurozone have been
disastrous. The “f iscal crisis” began when Greece, Ireland, and Portugal approached def ault in 2010, and
this specter of  def ault gave rise to the f iscal austerity policies instituted across the eurozone. Since
2010, f iscal policy has tightened drastically throughout Europe. Unemployment in the eurozone has
reached record levels. Today, Europe is f eeling the ef f ects of  a self -def eating cycle of  t ight f iscal
policies and low growth rates. We call this cycle of  f iscal reduction and economic contraction a “f iscal
trap”.
The basic trap is a cycle that moves f rom a decline in demand to f alling tax revenues, which in turn
engenders spending cuts and tax increases. Spending cuts and tax increases undercut the economy
f urther, and the cycle continues. The basic trap is illustrated by the f our dark arrows at the top and
centre of  Figure 1. (All arrows in the f igures show directions in which causality exerts itself .)
The upper pair of  dark arrows in the
f igure illustrates “f iscal drag”. In the
context of  mainstream US Keynesian
policymaking, f iscal drag ref ers to the
perverse tendency (f rom the
perspective of  good countercyclical
policy) of  governments to engage in
pro-cyclical f iscal policy, due to legal
requirements or polit ical pressure to try
to achieve balanced budgets. Such ill-
t imed spending cuts and tax increases
include most of  the austerity measures
adopted recently in countries around
the world.
The downward pressure on f iscal
stimulus exerted by an aversion to
def icits is shown in Figure 1 in the
movement f rom rising def icits to
spending cuts and increased taxes. The ef f ects of  such reductions include slow growth, rising
unemployment, declining aggregate demand, and f alling prof its. Moreover, f iscal austerity can be self -
def eating, as shown by the lower pair of  dark arrows. Low or negative growth f eeds back into the vicious
cycle of  the f iscal trap by reducing government tax revenues, raising expenditures on transf er
programmes, and hence increasing f iscal stress, completing the basic trap. The dynamics of  the basic
f iscal trap highlight the need f or temporary stimulus packages in t imes of  negative or slow growth. They
also underscore the value of  permanent “automatic stabilisers” such as means-tested benef its and a
progressive tax code.
The f ull f iscal trap includes the f orces illustrated by the light-coloured arrows in Figure 1. These arrows
describe the part of  the trap that owes its existence to a f aulty currency system, such as the euro, or
any other “sound money” system, including a gold-backed currency. The question of  how to escape the
f iscal trap is broadly answered by two competing perspectives: metallism and chartalism.
While well known to macroeconomists, other readers may appreciate a clarif ication of  the terms. The
“metallist” approach to solvency views the money supply as constrained by some outside condition.
Money is based on something that has a limited supply, either because it is based on something physical
(again, such as gold) or because of  some constraint on the government’s ability to issue liabilit ies. In
contrast, chartalists do not see the money supply as intrinsically constrained. This f reedom allows f iscal
policy to be guided only by an imperative to maintain f ull employment – without, of  course, spurring
excessive inf lation. Hence, the chartalist perspective regards solvency as a non- issue f or governments
that possess a sovereign currency, with the understanding that they must permit their exchange rates to
vary f reely. These two perspectives def ine very dif f erent approaches to economic recovery.
In our interpretation of  the European f iscal trap, the eurozone’s metallist monetary institutions play a
crucial role, turning a basic trap into a f ull trap. Some of  the more orthodox voices – f or example, the
Congressional Budget Of f ice, the International Monetary Fund  and the New York Times – have
underestimated or ignored the special handicap f aced by national governments that are f orced to
operate with one hand tied behind their back; namely, these governments lack the power to create “state
money.” In other words, eurozone metallists and like-minded orthodox commentators imagine that the
complete analysis shown in Figure 1 is equally applicable to all nations with sovereign debt, including
“sovereign currency” countries such as Canada, Japan, the United States, and the UK. But it is not.
Central banks in countries with sovereign currencies and f lexible exchange rates use open market
operations to keep short- term interest rates stable, and can even, given enough time, consistently hit a
target f or long-term yields, even when they are running up large debts. For example, the US Federal
Reserve ef f ectively set rates on longer-term Treasury debt during the late 1940s and early 1950s. More
recently, the Fed’s strategy to keep long-term rates low has led to record- low average home mortgage
interest rates, albeit under t ightened lending standards. Figure 2 highlights the way that such central bank
operations ensure that governments in sovereign-currency nations can “escape” the f ull- trap mechanism.
The cycle of  the f ull f iscal trap is broken when the government makes its own means of  payment. This is
both a prudent and a proven system, but its distinctive workings are sometimes f orgotten in t imes of
economic turmoil. On the other hand, the basic trap illustrated by the dark-coloured arrows alone can
present a serious problem in cases such as those of  the UK and the United States: interest rates remain
very low, and capital markets remain conf ident in the solvency of  the central governments involved, but
job creation and demand f or private-sector output are f ar too weak.
Orthodox economics, the same
perspective that helped to bring us the
f inancial crisis and the Great Recession
of  2007–09, has f ailed to provide an
ef f ective strategy f or economic growth.
This perspective has steered the
eurozone into a self - imposed f iscal trap
and may convince policymakers in
Washington to do the same. We argue
f or another approach. The renewed
vigour seen in many heterodox
economic tradit ions of f ers a better
hope f or ef f ective policies that will help
countries steer clear of  the f iscal trap
and put their economies back on a path
to recovery.
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